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Abstract
We correct an omission in the deﬁnition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in
[B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or
KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain
result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.
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1. Two counter examples
The model and notation are as in Klaus and Klijn [1] or KK05 for short. We denote the
set of feasible, individually rational, and stable matchings for a couples market (PH,PC) by
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M(PH,PC), I(PH,PC), and S(PH,PC), respectively. The following example demonstrates
that the weak responsiveness condition of KK05 is not sufﬁcient to ensure the existence of stable
matchings.
1.1. KK05’s weakly responsive preferences
Couple c = (sk,sl) has weakly responsive preferences if there exist preferences sk and sl
such that
(i) for all h ∈ H,
(u,h)  c (u,u) if and only if h  sl u and
(h,u)  c (u,u) if and only if h  sk u,
(ii) for all hp,hq,hr ∈ H ∪{u},





hp sl u,hq sk u, and hp  sl hr imply (hq,hp)  c (hq,hr)

.
Example 1.1 (Counter example to KK05’s Theorem 3.3 (Existence)). Consider the couples mar-
ket (PH,PC) where preferences are given by Table 1.1
The next two claims prove that (PH,PC) is a counter example to Theorem 3.3 in KK05.
Claim 1. S(PH,PC) =∅.
Let μ ∈ M(PH,PC) and m be the number of matched students at μ.
Case m = 0. Clearly, ((s1,s2),(h1,h2)) blocks μ.
Case m = 1,3. There is a couple with only one matched member. This couple would prefer both
its members being unmatched. So, μ/ ∈ I(PH,PC).
Case m = 2. If a couple is not matched to one of the two acceptable hospital combinations as
speciﬁed in Table 1, then μ/ ∈ I(PH,PC). This leaves us with the four matchings displayed in
Table 2, for each of which a blocking coalition is provided.
1 An explanation of a real-world situation inducing these preferences can be found in Nakamura [2].B. Klaus et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 2227–2233 2229
Table 2
Matchings and blocking coalitions.
Matching h1 h2 h3 h4 Blocking coalition
1 s1 s2 ∅∅((s3,s4),(h2,h3))
2 ∅ s3 s4 ∅ ((s1,s2),(h3,h4))
3 ∅∅s1 s2 ((s3,s4),(h4,h1))
4 s4 ∅∅s3 ((s1,s2),(h1,h2))
Table 3
Couples market 1.2.
¯ PH ¯ PC ¯ PS( ¯ PC)
h1 h2 (s1,s2)s 1 s2
s1 s2 h1,h2 h2 h1






Case m = 4. Since μ ∈ I(PH,PC), (s1,s2) is matched to either (h1,h2) or (h3,h4) and (s3,s4)
is matched to either (h2,h3) or (h4,h1); contradicting μ ∈ M(PH,PC).
Claim 2. The couples’ preferences PC are (KK05-)weakly responsive.
Let P(si) = u,...(i = 1,2,3,4). We check weak responsiveness conditions (i) and (ii).
(i) For no c ∈ C, there is an h ∈ H with (u,h)  c (u,u) or (h,u)  c (u,u). Similarly, for no
s ∈ S, there is an h ∈ H with h  s u. So, condition (i) is satisﬁed.
(ii) For each s ∈ S and each h ∈ H, u s h. So, in condition (ii), hp = u and hq = u. Since for
any hr ∈ H, (u,u)  c (hr,u)and (u,u)  c (u,hr), condition (ii) is also satisﬁed.
The next example, which was provided by Fuhito Kojima, demonstrates that based on the
deﬁnition of couples’ weakly responsive preferences only over feasible pairs, not all matchings
that are stable in the so-called associated singles market need to be stable for the original couples
market.
Example 1.2 (Counter example to KK05’s Theorem 3.3 (Stability)). Consider the couples market
( ¯ PH, ¯ PC) and the associated singles market ( ¯ PH, ¯ PS( ¯ PC)) where preferences are given by
Table 3.
It is easy to check that the associated singles market ( ¯ PH, ¯ PS( ¯ PC)) has two stable matchings,
namely μ(S) = h1,h2 and μ (S) = h2,h1. However, μ  / ∈ S( ¯ PH, ¯ PC).
2. Corrections: weak responsiveness and domain maximality
Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 in KK05 are affected by the omission in the deﬁnition of weak respon-
siveness that Example 1.1 illustrates. We now formulate a weak additional condition that is in
line with KK05’s intuitive motivation and description of weak responsiveness.2230 B. Klaus et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 2227–2233
The driving force behind Example 1.1 is that for a couple two individually undesirable posi-
tions can be combined to a desirable allotment. To exclude this possibility, we add condition (iii)
to KK05’s deﬁnition of weak responsiveness.
2.1. Weakly responsive preferences, condition (iii)
(iii) for all h ,h   ∈ H, h   = h  , u  sk h  and u  sl h   imply (u,u)  c (h ,h  ).
KK05 (page 82, lines 9–12) motivated weak responsiveness as follows: “The idea of this ex-
tension [i.e., from responsiveness to weak responsiveness] is that the exactassociated preferences
that deal with the comparison of unacceptable positions are irrelevant with respect to stability
since an agent can always replace any unacceptable position with unemployment.” Without con-
dition (iii), the only case where the agents in a couple may not want to replace their unacceptable
positions by unemployment occurs when the combination of them is acceptable – a case that is
now excluded by (iii). We would like to emphasize that since condition (iii) is still in line with the
intuition that motivated weak responsiveness, we do not ﬁnd it necessary to change the nomen-
clature. The corrected weak responsiveness is logically equivalent to Nakamura’s [2] “reasonable
responsiveness” condition.
What is behind Example 1.2 is that even though h2 is student s1’s individually best hospital
and h1 is student s2’s individually best hospital, the couple (s1,s2) prefers (h1,h2) to (h2,h1).
One reason why the couples’ preferences in Example 1.2 are weakly responsive is that we have
deﬁned couples’ preferences only over ordered pairs of different hospitals.
One way to deal with the pathological character of Example 1.2 is to drop the feasibility
constraint in the deﬁnition of couples’ preferences, i.e., to assume that couples’ preferences in-
clude entries of the form (h,h), h ∈ H. Then, the couples’ preferences in Example 1.2 are no
longer weakly responsive (we would have (h2,h1)  c (h1,h1)  c (h1,h2)).2 The drawback of
this correction is that then the proof of another result is affected and cannot easily be restored.3
Alternatively, we can relax the statement of KK05’s Theorem 3.3 as follows.
KK05’s Theorem 3.3 (Stability for weakly responsive preferences). Let (PH,PC) be a couples
market where couples have weakly responsive preferences. Then, any matching that is stable
for an associated singles market (PH,PS(PC)) induces4 a stable matching for (PH,PC).I n
particular, there exists a stable matching for (PH,PC).
Proof. The ﬁrst 13 lines of the proof are identical to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in KK05. Then
the next two lines should be adjusted as follows (the change is marked in bold face). “Assume
hp ≺sk u and hq ≺sl u. Then by weak responsiveness (iii), (u,u)  c (hp,hq).U s i n g...”T h e
proof continues now as in KK05 until the end of page 83. We then continue as follows.
If hp  = μ(sl), then weak responsiveness (ii) implies (μ(sk),μ(sl))  c (hp,μ(sl))  c
(hp,hq), which contradicts (b1). If hq  = μ(sk), then similarly we obtain a contradiction to (b2).
2 Note that with this correction, line 1 on page 84 in KK05’s proof of Theorem 3.3 would be correct since with our
correction (hp,μ(sl)) is also a part of the couples’ preferences if hp = μ(sl).
3 The construction in our proof of KK05’s Theorem 3.5 that we present later will not work, e.g., in Cases 2.2 and 2.3,
the entry (hr,hq) with hr = hq would be problematic.
4 That is, any matching μ that is stable for (PH,PS(PC)) either is also stable for (PH,PC) or a stable matching for
(PH,PC) can be easily obtained from μ as explained in the proof.B. Klaus et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 2227–2233 2231
Note that the only case for which the last argument does not apply is the case where hp = μ(sl)
and hq = μ(sk). In other words, all blocking coalitions are of the form ((sk,sl),(μ(sl),μ(sk))).
Then we can easily obtain a stable matching μ  from μ by satisfying all these blocking
coalitions, i.e., for all couples (sk,sl) involved in a blocking coalition, μ (sk) = μ(sl) and
μ (sl) = μ(sk). 
Next, we state KK05’s Theorem 3.5 and provide a completely new and more accessible proof
(an alternative proof can be found in Nakamura [2]).
KK05’s Theorem 3.5 (Maximal domain I). For couples markets with restricted strictly unem-
ployment averse couples,5 the domain of weakly responsive preferences is a maximal domain for
the existence of stable matchings.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a counter example (PH,PC) with C ={ c1,c2}
for each possible violation of weak responsiveness. Let c1 = (s1,s2) and c1 be such that c1’s
preferences are restricted strictly unemployment averse, but not weakly responsive.
Consider students’ preferences s1 and s2 deﬁned such that for all h,h  ∈ H ∪{u},[ h s1 h 
if and only if (h,u) c1 (h ,u)] and [h s2 h  if and only if (u,h) c1 (u,h )]. In particular,
preferences s1, s2, and c1 satisfy (i).
Couple c1’s preferences not being responsive means that there do not exist students’ pref-
erences that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). Thus, s1 and s2 as deﬁned above, together
with c1, violate condition (ii) or (iii). We show that each possible violation of (ii) or (iii) is
either incompatible with restricted strict unemployment aversion or is such that we can construct
preferences of the hospitals and restricted strictly unemployment averse and weakly responsive
preferences of the other couples for which no stable matching exists.
Case 1. Assume that s1, s2, and c1 violate condition (iii).
Then, there exist h ,h   ∈ H, h   = h  , such that u  s1 h , u  s2 h  , and (h ,h  )  c1 (u,u).
Thus, by the deﬁnition of s1 and s2, (u,u)  c1 (h ,u)and (u,u)  c1 (u,h  ).
Now, for h ,h   and h ∈ H\{h ,h  } we specify P(h ) = s1,s3,∅,..., P(h  ) = s3,s2,∅,...,
and P(h) =∅ ,.... Couple c2 = (s3,s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse re-
sponsive preferences based on P(s3) = h ,h  ,u,... and P(s4) = u,.... Note that for any
μ ∈ I(PH,PC), μ(c2) ∈{ (h ,u),(h  ,u),(u,u)}. Assume μ ∈ S(PH,PC). Then, μ(c1) ∈
{(h ,h  ),(u,u)}.I fμ(c2) = (u,u), then μ is blocked by (c2,(h  ,u)).I fμ(c2) = (h  ,u), then
μ(c1) = (u,u). Hence, μ is blocked by (c2,(h ,u)).I fμ(c2) = (h ,u), then μ is blocked by
(c1,(h ,h  )). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked.
Case 2. Assume that s1, s2, and c1 violate condition (ii). We split condition (ii) into sub-
conditions:
(iia) Condition (ii) for hr = u: for all hp,hq ∈ H ∪{u},
(iia.1) [hp  s1 u and hq s2 u imply (hp,hq)  c1 (u,hq)] and
(iia.2) [hp  s2 u and hq s1 u imply (hq,hp)  c1 (hq,u)],
5 Couple c has restricted strictly unemployment averse preferences if for any pair of acceptable positions it is worse
off if one of its partners loses his/her acceptable position. Formally, for all (hp,hq) such that (hp,u) c (u,u) and
(u,hq)  c (u,u), (hp,hq)  c (hp,u)and (hp,hq)  c (u,hq).2232 B. Klaus et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 2227–2233
(iib) Condition (ii) for u  s1 hr: for all hp,hq,hr ∈ H ∪{u},
(iib.1) [hp s1 u  s1 hr and hq s2 u imply (hp,hq)  c1 (hr,hq)] and
(iib.2) [hp s2 u  s2 hr and hq s1 u imply (hq,hp)  c1 (hq,hr)],
(iic) Condition (ii) for hr  s1 u: for all hp,hq,hr ∈ H ∪{u},
(iic.1) [hp  s1 hr  s1 u and hq s2 u imply (hp,hq)  c1 (hr,hq)] and
(iic.2) [hp  s2 hr  s2 u and hq s1 u imply (hq,hp)  c1 (hq,hr)].
Case 2.1. Restricted strict unemployment aversion implies (iia).
(iia.1): Consider hp  s1 u and hq s2 u. Thus, by the deﬁnition of s1 and s2, (hp,u) c1
(u,u) and (u,hq) c1 (u,u).I fhq = u, then (hp,u) c1 (u,u) implies (iia.1). If hq  = u,
then hq  s2 u and, by the deﬁnition of s2, (u,hq)  c1 (u,u). Hence, by restricted strict
unemployment aversion, (hp,hq)  c1 (u,hq) and (iia.1) holds. The proof for (iia.2) is
similar.
Case 2.2. Assume that s1, s2, and c1 violate condition (iib).
(iib.1): Consider hp s1 u  s1 hr and hq s2 u. Thus, by the deﬁnition of s1 and s2,
(hp,u)c1 (u,u)  c1 (hr,u)and (u,hq) c1 (u,u).I fhq = u, then (hp,u) c1 (hr,u)
implies (iib.1). Thus, let hq  = u and assume, in contradiction to (iib.1), (hr,hq)  c1
(hp,hq). By restricted strict unemployment aversion, (hp,hq) c1 (u,hq)  c1 (u,u).
Thus, (hr,hq)  c1 (u,hq)  c1 (u,u).
For hr,hq ∈ H and h ∈ H\{hr,hq} we specify P(hr) = s1,s3,∅,..., P(hq) = s3,s2,∅,...,
and P(h)=∅ ,.... Couple c2 = (s3,s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse respon-
sive preferences based on P(s3) = hr,hq,u,... and P(s4) = u,.... For any μ ∈ I(PH,PC),
μ(c2) ∈{ (hr,u),(hq,u),(u,u)}. Assume μ ∈ S(PH,PC).I fμ(c2) = (u,u), then μ is blocked
by (c2,(hq,u)).I fμ(c2) = (hr,u), then by μ ∈ I(PH,PC), μ(c1) ∈{ (u,u),(u,hq)}. Hence, μ
is blocked by (c1,(hr,hq)).I fμ(c2) = (hq,u), then by μ ∈ I(PH,PC), μ(c1) = (u,u). Hence,
μ is blocked by (c2,(hr,u)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked. The proof
for (iib.2) is similar.
Case 2.3. Assume that s1, s2, and c1 violate condition (iic).
(iic.1): Consider hp  s1 hr  s1 u and hq s2 u. Thus, by the deﬁnition of s1 and s2,
(hp,u) c1 (hr,u) c1 (u,u) and (u,hq) c1 (u,u).I fhq = u, then (hp,u) c1 (hr,u)
implies (iic.1). Thus, let hq  = u and assume, in contradiction to (iic.1), (hr,hq)  c1
(hp,hq). By restricted strict unemployment aversion, (hp,hq)  c1 (hp,u) c1 (u,u)
and (hp,hq)  c1 (u,hq)  c1 (u,u). Thus, (hr,hq)  c1 (hp,hq)  c1 (u,u), (hr,hq)  c1
(hp,u), and (hr,hq)  c1 (u,hq).
For hp,hr,hq ∈ H and h ∈ H\{hp,hr,hq} we specify P(hp) = s1,∅,..., P(hr) =
s1,s3,∅,..., P(hq) = s3,s2,∅,..., and P(h)=∅ ,.... Couple c2 = (s3,s4) has restricted
strictly unemployment averse responsive preferences based on P(s3) = hr,hq,u,... and
P(s4) = u,.... For any μ ∈ I(PH,PC), μ(c2) ∈{ (hr,u),(hq,u),(u,u)}. Assume μ ∈
S(PH,PC).I fμ(c2) = (u,u), then μ is blocked by (c2,(hq,u)).I fμ(c2) = (hr,u), then by μ ∈
I(PH,PC), μ(c1) ∈{ (hp,hq),(hp,u),(u,hq),(u,u)}. Hence, μ is blocked by (c1,(hr,hq)).B. Klaus et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 2227–2233 2233
If μ(c2) = (hq,u), then by μ ∈ I(PH,PC), μ(c1) ∈{ (hp,u),(hr,u),(u,u)}.I fμ(c1) ∈
{(hp,u),(u,u)}, then μ is blocked by (c2,(hr,u)).I fμ(c1) = (hr,u), then μ is blocked by
(c1,(hp,u)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked. The proof for (iic.2) is
similar. 
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